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BIOTECHNOLOGY: A FIRST ORDER
TECHNICO-LEGAL REVOLUTION
Vincent M. Brannigan*
INTRODUCTION

In a 1987 article in Technology Review,1 Peter Huber makes a
series of doomsday predictions concerning the regulation of biotechnology.2 He asserts that judicial and regulatory activities threaten
the United States' lead in biotechnology, and offers the usual prescription - a single federal agency to regulate the technology and
increased judicial deference in products liability cases to agency decisions which approved of the challenged test or commercial opera* Associate Professor, Department of Textiles and Consumer Economics, University of
Maryland, College Park; Adjunct Professor of Technology and Law, Georgetown University;
B.A. University of Maryland, 1973; J.D. Georgetown University, 1975.
1. Huber, Biotechnology and the Regulation Hydra, TECH. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 57.
2. For the purpose of this Article, the term "biotechnology" will comprise the full range
of technologies available due to progress in the mapping of proteins, including recombinant
DNA, RNA, cell fusion, etc. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS

(1984).

This collection of Articles on Biotechnology and the Law is dedicated to the late Dr.
Margaret Oakley Dayhoff. Dr. Dayhoff pioneered the collection of protein sequences and
structures that constitute the fundamental raw materials for the development of modern biotechnology. She developed and collected statistical tools needed to make genetic engineering a
practical possibility and was one of the first researchers to use protein sequences as "living
fossils" to probe the origin of life and the process of evolution. Dr. Dayhoff was the first
woman elected president of the Biophysical Society and since her untimely death in 1983, the
Margaret Oakley Dayhoff Award has been given annually in her honor to an outstanding
junior woman scientist through the Biophysical Society.
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tion. 3 Other commentators emphasize the unique risks of biotechnology and propose more or less sweeping restraints on its
development.'
Both sides seem to agree that biotechnology is something novel,
and will thus require novel legal solutions. This Article exposes the
inaccuracies of this view. Biotechnology is something new, but the
legal system will cope with it using a describable yet unpredictable
methodology. The outcome of the process will depend more on the
political strength of the parties than on purely legal or technical arguments. The debate will follow the classic pattern of a technicolegal revolution. 5
I. TECHNICO-LEGAL REVOLUTIONS

A technico-legal revolution occurs when a given technological
advance cannot be clearly analogized to existing legal structures. A

technico-legal revolution consists of a series of stages in the legal
response to the novel developments in technology.' The purpose of
this Article is to describe the theory of a technico-legal revolution,7
point out past examples of such revolutions,8 and then apply the theory to the developments in biotechnology. 9 Understanding the development of legal principles applicable to biotechnology as an example
of the legal system's process of adapting to technological change al-

lows us to anticipate and discount the spurious legal arguments inevitably made each time a new technology is developed.
A. Science and Technology
In defining a technico-legal revolution, the first question concerns the nature of technology. Technology is the application of or3. See Huber, supra note I; see also Withers & Kenworthy, Biotechnology: Can a New
Technology Survive, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 673 (1987) (discussing the industry view of the

problems presented by government regulation).
4.

gies, 36

See, e.g., McGarity & Bayer, FederalRegulation of Emerging Genetic TechnoloVAND.

L. REV. 461 (1983) (examining the legal debate over regulation and recom-

mending a legislative framework for biotechnology); Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE LJ. 553 (1986) (authored by Ruth E.

Harlow) (discussing current biotechnology regulation, foreseeable problems, and proposed
legislation).
5. The concept of a technico-legal revolution was first discussed in Brannigan &
Dayhoff, Medical Informatics: The Revolution in Law, Technology, and Medicine, 7 J. LEGAL
MED. 1 (1986).
6. Id. at 26; see infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.

7. See infra notes 10-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 44-101 and accompanying text.

9. See infra notes 102-177 and accompanying text.
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ganized knowledge to human needs.1" For our purpose, it is worth
restating the difference between science and technology. Science essentially defines what we know, while technology defines what we
can use. This is not to imply that the two are mutually exclusive, but
they do operate by different rules. Lee Loevinger's statement that
"[t]echnology is applied science"'" is certainly wrong. There are
wholly empirical technologies which are nonetheless useful for being
empirical. Inevitably, even the most empirical technology can be improved by submitting it to extensive scientific analysis. Other technologies are derived directly from underlying scientific principles.
There is a relationship, which can be described as a continuum between the more "scientific" technologies and the purely empirical
technologies. 1 2 The derivation of the technology is not critical - it is
the utility of knowledge, not its exactness, that makes it usable as a
technology. a
The difference between scientific and empirical technology is
important because the legal system often defers to the developers of
a science or technology in determining the appropriate legal response.1 4 While there are exceptions,1 5 few courts show themselves
willing to simply disbelieve scientists and technologists. However,
what we can expect of the experts differs with the type of technology. Scientists should be prepared to back their conclusions with theory and experiment, while empirical technologists provide accumu10.
11.
(1985).
12.
13.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2348 (3d ed. 1976).
Loevinger, Science, Technology and Law in Modern Society, 26 JURIMETRICS J.1, 2
Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 5, at 18.
An interesting comparison of the difference between science and technology can be

derived by comparing the two leading works on the development of the atomic bomb. Compare
R. RHODES. THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (1988) (treating the atomic bomb as a prob-

lem of physics; General Groves, chief of the Manhattan project, makes his appearance on page
424) with S. GROUEFF, MANHATTAN PRoiECT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE MAKING OF THE

ATOMIC BOMB (1967) (treating the bomb as an exercise in engineering, trying to solve the
practical problems of building the bomb; General Groves makes his appearance on page 3).
The distinction is critical because of the influence of the nuclear scientists on the postwar era
and the technological problems that have affected the nuclear field, such as nuclear waste,
containment of reactor disasters, breeder reactors, and the enormous investment in as yet un-

succesful commercial fusion power.
14. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the systolic
blood pressure deception test had not gained sufficient scientific recognition so as to be admissible); see also J. NYHART & M. CARROW, LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION: RESOLVING REGULATORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1983) (giving a multidisciplinary

look at the regulatory problem).
15. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 408-18, 428-30 (D. Kan.
1984) (extensive critique of expert testimony in the difficult area of low dose radiation).
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lated cases, studies and opinion. Failure to take this difference into
account leads to the error of asking a scientist for an opinion, or
admitting an empiricist's untestable theory. 6 Therefore, it is essential in each case to define what type of technology is present since
the type of technology is critical to the type of questions which
should be asked.
In Puharich v. Brenner,17 Judge Harold Leventhal articulated
the practical significance of the two end points on the technology
continuum. Writing for the court, Judge Leventhal held that a patent was properly denied to the inventor of an ESP enhancer who
failed to either explain his advance theoretically or provide experimental proof of its operation. 8
Biotechnology was initially a scientifically-driven technology
which grew out of basic scientific research into the nature of DNA.
However, as the technology of recombinant DNA becomes more
widespread, it will move into the range of an empirical technology,
as individual experimenters use their own insight, hunches and accidental findings to increase the number of usable organisms. As the
technology diffuses, we will rely much less on an underlying theory,
and much more on our experiences."9
B.

Technological Revolutions

The legal system has long been required to respond to advances
in technology. While some of these responses, such as copyright
16. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). In Reserve Mining,
the same witness appeared both as a scientist and a public health physician. The court accepted his scientific conclusion that water-borne asbestos had not been proved to cause cancer,
as well as his opinion as a physician that in the absence of data, he would presume that the
water-borne asbestos was harmful. Id. at 513-14, 517-19; see also Brannigan & Dayhoff,
supra note 5, at 16-19 (discussing the Reserve Mining testimony).
17. 415 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
18. See id. at 981. As Judge Leventhal stated:
[W]e do not think the Patent Office exceeded its authority when it came, in effect,
to insist that the applicant support operability by an additional submission, either
(a) a duplication of the experiment, or alternatively (b) a convincing theoretical
explanation for the claimed effects of invention.
The applicant here did not show an acceptance of his hypothesis by a substantial section of the scientific community, nor did he present the kind of evidence, such
as duplication of the experiment, that is so persuasive on its own as to make it
unreasonable to reject the applicant's claim.
Id. at 981-82.
19, See Monmaney, Yeast at Work, Sci., July-Aug. 1985, at 30, 33 (describing the
current technology as "look[ing] for genes in diverse species in the manner of mechanics
prowling for spare parts in a junk yard.").
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law,20 have been well defined, others, such as the legal treatment of
computer software, have been poorly defined. 1 The problem has usually arisen when the legal system has not been able to easily classify
a new technology in accordance with existing legal structures. The
inability to apply existing doctrines creates a discontinuity in the
law, and the interested parties try to take advantage of this discontinuity to secure a favorable legal verdict on the new technology. It is
this conflict and the ensuing methods of resolving the discontinuity
that produces the distinctive nature of the technico-legal revolution.
Not every technological advance leads to a technico-legal
revolution. Railroads, for example, while a quantum leap in transportation technology, were legally indistinguishable from horsedrawn wagons operating on private turnpikes. The legal system was
fully familiar with rights of way, common carriers, and all of the
other requirements. Airplanes, on the other hand, forced fundamental changes in the concepts of property, since they passed over property without payment.22
There are many types of technico-legal revolutions. The legal
responses to inventions, discoveries, and refinements of existing technologies can all qualify because each may require reinterpretation of
an existing legal rule. The common element is that the technological
change produces a situation which does not clearly fit under existing
legal rules. The introduction of such a technology produces a period
of conflict and confusion, as various parties attempt to control the
20. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), illustrates
both the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend copyright law to new technologies and its deference to Congress:

Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the
Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary ....

The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound policy, as well as

history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permu-

tations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
Id. at 430-31 (citations omitted). Contrast this statement with the expansive treatment of the

patent statute in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), discussed infra notes 110-20
and accompanying text.

21.

See Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective

Medical Computer Programs,7 Am.J.L. & MED. 123 (1981); Brannigan, The Regulation of
Medical Expert Computer Software as a "Device" Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,

27

JURIMETRICS

J. 370 (1987).

22. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937) (granting air carriers the right to navigate over private property).
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new technology by making it fit preexisting legal structures.
One of the distinctive features of a technico-legal revolution is
that it may be a perfectly ordinary development in one legal area,
yet revolutionary when applied to another. In such a case, tactical
assertions are made that the issue has already been decided. Thus, it
becomes important to categorize the various types of technico-legal
revolutions.
C. Types of Technico-Legal Revolutions
Categorizing technico-legal revolutions can be done in several
ways, but it is clear that the particular field of the technology is the
least important means of categorization since it is not the area of the
development that creates the problem but its effect. Likewise, the
empirical or scientific nature of the technology does not directly affect the law. Because the touchstone of a technico-legal revolution is
the effect of the technology on the legal system, the categories of
analysis which are most useful are those which are based on fundamental distinctions in the operation of the legal system. Such distinctions are unlikely to change, even with continuing developments in
technology.
Technico-lega! revolutions seem to fall into four distinct legal
categories: (1) Proprietary Rights; (2) Personal Injury Risk; (3)
Risk to Other Protected Interests; and (4) Evidence.
1. Proprietary Rights." - - Conflicts in the area of Proprietary
Rights involve control over the economic benefits created by a new
technology. The exploitation of underground oil reserves, for example, required redefinition of property rights. The development of solar energy required reanalysis of traditional issues surrounding the
right to sunlight. The allocation of such economic benefits is the subject of a technico-legal revolution in the Proprietary Rights area.
2. Personal Injury Risk.- The second area deals with liability
for injuries resulting from the risks presented by a new technology.
Compensation for personal injury occupies a special status in the
law, since compensation is generally considered a necessary but inadequate response to a technology that causes injury to human life. In
any risky technology a number of questions have to be answered.
Will the risk be allowed? Who will control the level of risk? Who
will be exposed to the risk? Who will pay for the losses? Which
23. For the purpose of this Article, Proprietary Rights will be limited to those instances
in which the technology creates a new type of property.
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losses will be compensated? 24 Will new rules of compensation be
fashioned to assist or hinder the developing technology?
3. Risk to Other Protected Interests.- Technological advances
may cause injury to existing interests apart from personal injuries.
This area addresses actual injury to property, reduction in property
value, and assertions of interference with the exercise of a protected
interest. The classification of an injury as "damnum absque injuria"
reflects the conclusion of the legal system that the particular interest
is not protected.2 5
4. Evidence.- The fourth area involves the debate over which
technological developments may be admitted as evidence to prove a
case. The litigation setting provides an important laboratory in
which the accuracy of various scientific approaches is aggressively
debated, with recorded testimony and decisive answers emerging.
The process thus ensures that the debate will be widely publicized in
the legal community.
D. First and Second Order Revolutions
The same technological development can create a revolution in
several of these areas. Moreover, the more revolutionary a technology, the more likely it is to create revolutions in more than one of
these areas. At least two classes of technico-legal revolutions might
be usefully analyzed. A "First Order" revolution is a technico-legal
revolution which involves more than one of the above categories. A
"Second Order" revolution is one which occurs solely within one category. The difference between the two is that in a first order revolution, there may be a significant strategic advantage in being able to
decide which category will be resolved first, since such a determination will have spill-over effects in other areas. For example, the
proliferation of computer software is a first order technico-legal
revolution. The copyright question was settled first, and the award of
24. The debate over the compensability of emotional distress would be addressed in this
area. See, e.g., Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk,
Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 83; see also Note, Designer Genes
That Don't Fit: A Tort Regime For Commercial Releases of Genetic Engineering Products,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1987) (proposing a tort model to regulate emerging technologies and
protect the public).
25. See Fields v. Napa Milling Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 442, 447-48, 330 P.2d 459, 462
(1958) (reviewing the traditional tort doctrines of "injuria absque damno" and "damnum absque injuria," which the court interprets to mean that "a wrong without damage does not
constitute a cause of action for damages any more than damage without wrong does not ordi-

narily constitute a cause of action.").
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copyright for programs arguably created a viable claim of first
amendment protection when government officials claimed that those
same programs could be regulated.28 Similarly, the determination
that a computer program is "goods" for the purpose of commercial
law could have a direct influence on whether software is a "product"
for liability purposes,27 and a "device" for regulatory purposes.
Second order technico-legal revolutions are much simpler. Fingerprints, however revolutionary as evidence, have little impact
outside the evidentiary area.
The study of first order revolutions is therefore more complex,
but ultimately of more significance in understanding the legal system's process of adapting to technological change. Biotechnology is

unquestionably a first order technico-legal revolution. In fact, it is
one of the very rare technico-legal revolutions that will involve all
four areas.
E. Limitations on Analysis
One of the anomalies of the concept of a technico-legal revolution is that the concept is useful in determining the development of
the revolution, but it is not entirely successful in defining when a
technico-legal revolution exists in the first place. When a technological revolution occurs, the applicability of existing legal structures
may be questioned, not because such questions are inherent in the
technology but rather as part of a strategy to obtain more favorable
legal status for the technology. Similarly, the mere fact that a technology is assigned to the same legal regime that was originally proposed does not mean that a technico-legal revolution has not taken
place. Polygraphs, despite inadmissibility as evidence, have been crucial in setting the fundamental legal rules for the level of certainty
required to admit various types of scientific evidence. 8
Therefore, it is not possible to know for certain that a technicolegal revolution exists except in retrospect. Early assertions of the
existence or nonexistence of a revolution are part of the strategy of
the various parties to influence the legal system.2" Since the decision
26. See Brannigan, supra note 21, at 378-79.
27. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 21, at 130 (assessing issues posed by personal
injuries caused by medical software, and predicting that software will be treated by courts as
products, subjecting manufacturers to strict liability).
28. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility standards developed under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and its progeny).

29. In particular, the early aggressive legal responses to genetic engineering have been
criticized as overkill. However, since these early responses represented a political judgment
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as to which legal regime will apply to a new technology is heavily
value-laden, analysts should be wary of premature predictions of a
technico-legal revolution.
Since technico-legal revolutions can be determined only in retrospect, doubts might be raised as to the utility of such a concept.
However, each technico-legal revolution goes through a well-defined
chronological process, beginning with the development of the technology and ending with the assignment of the technology to a specific legal regime. At some point during these phases, it is obvious
that a technico-legal revolution has occurred. Once it becomes clear
that the process is occurring, the participation of the public in the
process becomes much easier and possibly more productive.
F. Phases of Technico-Legal Revolutions
Each technico-legal revolution passes through four distinct
phases. Although there is no fixed time period for each phase, a fixed
order is identifiable. These phases are: (1) Autonomy, (2) Conflict,
(3) Determination, and (4) Resolution. The four phases describe the
actions of the parties, and provide a coherent structure for analysis
of the problem.
In the Autonomy phase, the developers of the technology act
without any significant constraints imposed by the legal system,
which is essentially reactive and often requires a triggering event
before it becomes involved. This phase may last a long time, but this
30
need not be the case.
The second phase is the Conflict phase. Conflict may come from
any of a number of sources, including a sudden disaster, a scientific
study, or a marketing plan. In the Conflict phase, the developers of
the technology are challenged by at least one other interest group,
such as competitors, consumers, government, or labor. The groups
stake out claims as to which prior legal analogy is most relevant, and
the irreconcilability of their conflict under standard legal analysis is
the hallmark of the technico-legal revolution.
The third phase is the Determination. In this phase, the parties
muster the factual support for their predetermined positions.
that the challenged advances could only be made if it were proved that their risk was negligible, the argument can then be made that that legal response to the risk was properly tailored
and adjusted to the developments in risk.

30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (describing the technico-legal revolution which occurred with the advent of the oil tanker, where the Autonomy phase lasted only

until the first tanker disaster).
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Technico-legal revolutions are extraordinarily fact-sensitive. The assignment of the technico-legal revolution to a particular legal regime
depends largely on which set of facts is accepted by the legal system. a" Such facts can be classified in two types. The first type might
be described as scientific facts, which are those derived from traditional scientific methods. The second group includes all untestable or
unverifiable statements which are products of professional judgment
or political consensus. 32 Typically, the parties know in the Conflict
phase which type of facts will support their position. Studies which
might produce unfavorable results will not normally be supported by
the party opposed to that position. Depending on the positions taken
in the Conflict phase, the parties will want either prompt or extended
analysis during the Determination phase.
The fourth phase is Resolution. In this phase the legal system
assigns the technology to a legal structure. One of the most important effects of the Resolution phase is the assignment of the burden
of proof concerning unknown events. The fact that this burden is
assigned after the factual material has been developed is one of the
most striking characteristics of a technico-legal revolution.
The movement of a technico-legal revolution through these
phases is best shown by an example. Under maritime law, the liability of a shipowner has generally been limited to the value of the
vessel and its freight pending. 3 In order to effectuate its purpose of
"encourag[ing] investments in ships and their employment in commerce" 34 and allowing American shipping to compete with that of
other maritime nations, 35 the rule of limited liability has been
broadly construed in favor of the shipowner.3"
The development of the oil supertanker precipitated a technicolegal revolution in this area. In the Autonomy phase, oil was carried
in tankers without regard for the rights of coastal dwellers. The
31. See Brannigan, Applying New Laws to Existing Buildings: Retrospective Fire
Safety Codes, 60 U. Dir. J. URB. L. 447, 460 (1983) (examining the regulatory facts at issue

in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1978) and criticizing the Fifth Circuit for its interpretation of the substantial evidence rule).
32, Examples of such facts include the point at which life begins in the abortion debate

and the value of life in cost-benefit analyses.
33, See Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (Supp. III 1985). See generally 3 Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed. rev. 1986). The term "freight pending" is defined as the
earnings of the voyage. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 131 (1894).

34, American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 263 (1933).
35. See Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Terminal, 251 U.S. 48, 53 (1919); The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894).

36. 3 Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 33, § 7, at 1-43 to -45.
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coastal dwellers' response to the first oil spills produced the Conflict

phase.3 While shipowners insisted on the ancient maritime principle
of limited liability, coastal dwellers argued that the potential for
damage greatly in excess of the value of a supertanker required the
imposition of traditional tort principles of liability.a8 In the Determination phase the argument shifted to facts of the injury. Just how
valuable are seabirds? Is the fear of another spill which reduces
property values calculable?39 In the Resolution phase, federal legislation, which included a liability ceiling, was developed to provide
partial compensation for cleanup costs.4 0
A matrix consisting of the categories and phases of technicolegal revolutions can be used to describe the actions of the parties:

37. The first major international spill occurred in 1967 when the Torrey Canyon, carrying 120,000 tons of oil, grounded on a reef 16 miles southwest of England. Both French and
English beaches were damaged, with cleanup and restoration costs totalling $16 million. See 3
Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 33, § 111, at 9-3 (describing the Torrey Canyon incident).
Prior to such events, shipwrecks were of significant economic benefit to coastal dwellers, since
whatever washed ashore could be salvaged by anyone who found it. See Murphy v. Dunham,
38 F. 503, 509 (1889) (citing Baker v. Hoag, 7 N.Y. 555 (1853)).
38. See Juric, A Review of Liability Issues Arising from the Grounding of the Oil
Tanker, Amoco Cadiz, 31 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 297, 304-05 (1987).
39. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 333 & n.5
(1973) (discussing the ecological effects of oil spills and quoting Note, Oil Pollution of the
Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L LJ., 316, 321-23 (1969) (footnotes omitted)).
40. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 311, 86
Stat. 816, 862 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Since the
1972 Act concerns only cleanup costs of the federal government, a number of states have
enacted legislation to provide compensation to the state and to individual claimants. See generally 3 Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 33, § 113, at 9-40.3 to -101. In a challenge to a
Florida statute which imposed liability on loading facilities and tankers, the Supreme Court in
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), held that Congress did
not intend the federal law to occupy the entire field of maritime pollution legislation. Id. at
329-30. As a result, the Court held that statute was not preempted since it was not inconsistent with the federal legislation. Id. at 330-37.
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CATEGORIES
PERSONAL

PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS

AUTONOMY

CONFLICT

riII4a~t.

DETERMINATION

RESOLUTION

developer of the
technology uses it
without restriction
for
own economic
advantage

INJURY RISK

parties who assert
other rights at risk
analogies to existing
attempt to stop or
parties at risk
ownership are made
limit the technology
attempt to stop or
by various claimants,
or obtain
limit the technology;
based on factual
compensation;
success depends on
similarities to
distinguished from
proof of connection
existing technologies
Personal Injury Risk
between technology
with favorable legal
area by relative
and injury
structures
acceptability of
compensation to
allow continued use

assuming proof of
injury, social utility

ownership of the

technology is decided determines further

~~~technology

G.

h
use of the
technology

developer of the
technology uses it
without
restriction in
a legal proceeding

parties who assert
another party in
other interests at
litigation claims the
risk claim a right to right to stop use of
stop or limit the
the technology as
technology
evidence

L

5

EVIDENCE

INTERESTS

developer of the
deeoper of the
technology uses It
technology uses i
Without restriction
without restriction
despite
to
others safety risk to despite
protectedriskinterests
of
others

another party makes
a claim of ownership
in the new
parties at risk claim
a right to stop or
technology, dispute
is based on
limit the technology
conflicting legal
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False Analogies

The key legal argument used by all parties in the Conflict and
Determination phases is the false analogy. Since technico-legal revolutions are defined as situations in which no exact analogy is possible, the false analogy involves comparing some of the attributes of a
new technology to those of a preexisting technology with a legal
structure favorable to that party, while ignoring those which would
lead to a different conclusion. The analogies are false in the sense
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that they are not exact as well as in the sense that the divergence
from the prior situation is often overlooked or minimized. In the case
of oil spills, for example, tanker owners claimed that shipowners had
never been responsible even in the case of a collision between ships.4 '
They failed to discuss the reason for this policy, however. By having
a single rule for all ships, there was a reciprocal advantage conferred
on all shipowners. All were immune from damages, but each needed
to insure their own cargoes, since all other ships were immune. Extension of this rule to the oil spill context ignored the difference in
position between coastal dwellers and other ships. Unlike shipowners,
coast dwellers gained no reciprocal advantage from immunity. They
carried the burdens, but received no benefits.42
False analogies may be particularly common in first order
technico-legal revolutions. Since the technological portion of the
analogy is complex, there is a tendency to emphasize the technological similarities while ignoring the underlying factual differences. 43
H. Prior Technico-Legal Revolutions
An example of a technico-legal revolution in each area is useful
to illustrate the nature of the technico-legal revolution.
1. Proprietary Rights.- The first such illustrative technico-legal revolution is the development of Proprietary Rights in the area of
radio and television broadcasting. The modern system of licensing
for radio broadcasters began with the federal Radio Act of 1927. 44
That Act set up the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) with the
power to allocate licenses to broadcast.45 As a specific condition of
the license, licensees were required to agree that they obtained no
41.

See Juric, supra note 38, at 304-05.

42. This failure to take into account all of the attributes of a situation generates the
false analogy. This process can be described in a model. Assume that a given technical revolu-

tion has three attributes [A,B,C]. The possible prior legal analogies could be defined as:
(1) [A,B,X] This is an example of a situation with a different attribute.

(2) [B,C] This is an example of a missing attribute.
(3) [A,B,C,Z] This is an example of an extra attribute.
In general, these three situations describe the full range of the false analogy and make useful
analytical tools.
43. See Brannigan, supra note 21, at 372-78 (discussing the analogy problem in the

context of regulation of medical software).
44.

Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,

48 Stat. 1064. See generally C. DILL, RADIO LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 76-78 (1938).
45.

See ch. 169, § 3, 44 Stat. 1162; see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,

319 U.S. 190, 213 (1942) (reviewing history of early broadcasting statutes and powers vested
in FRC); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 266 U.S. 267 (1932) (interpreting
licensing powers conferred on FRC by the Radio Act).
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property right to broadcast. 46 This provision was enacted against a
clear background of assertions of such a right in the use of the radio
spectrum. 47 Despite this explicit Congressional policy mandate and
cases decided just after the statute was passed which denied the existence of any right to broadcast, 48 the FRC soon developed the concept of a "renewal expectation. 4 9
In this example, the Autonomy stage was the assertion of a proprietary right to broadcast. The Conflict arose when others wished to
share in the broadcast right. The Determination phase contained a
long series of purportedly factual decisions by the FRC and later the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 50 which invariably upheld the right of the incumbent broadcaster.51 Finally, not without
some judicial reluctance, the courts acquiesced, not on the theory
that the broadcaster had somehow acquired a property right, but on
the equally doubtful theory that the broadcasters' incumbency provided a "factual" record on which to base the renewal, in contrast to
the "speculative" nature of the evaluation of a non-incumbent applicant.52 By treating the dispute as a factual matter to be resolved on
a case-by-case basis, the courts have allowed the FCC to essentially
continue the recognition of the property rights of broadcasters."
Thus, allocation of the burden of proof has been the critical factor in
the Resolution stage.
2. Personal Injury Risk.- The development of the steamboat
provides an example of a technico-legal revolution in the safety area
in which critical events shaped the legal response to the new technology. Two separate debates emerged from the development of the
steamboat. The first, in the Proprietary Rights area, was whether the
46, See ch. 169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1166.
47. See C. DILL, supra note 44, at 196.
48. See, e.g., City of New York v. FRC, 36 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Technical Radio
Laboratory v. FRC, 36 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
49. See Note, The Recognition of Legitimate Renewal Expectancies in Broadcast Licensing, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 410 (1980) (authored by Andrew Clark Gold) (discussing the
history of communications licensing leading to "renewal expectation" policy).
50. The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which superseded the 1927 Act, replaced the
FRC with the FCC, and vested in the FCC even greater powers than had been granted to the
FRC. See C. DILL, supra note 44, at 77.
51. See Note, supra note 49, at 410 (noting that the FCC has traditionally favored
incumbent licensees).
52. Id. at 415 (citing Hearst Radio Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951), in which the
FCC held that it was preferable to continue with proven service of incumbent station than to
give license to challenger with unproven record).
53. Id. at 416.
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states had the power to grant monopolies to steamboat operators in
their territorial waters. The Supreme Court's answer was that they
did not." The second was how to deal with the incredible carnage of
steamboat explosions,55 a debate in which the response of the parties
followed what has become a well-trodden path.5
The first deaths from steamboat boiler explosions occurred in
1817, 5 and in 1824, the steamer Aetna exploded, killing thirteen
5
persons.58 At least fifty people died each year from 1825 to 1830. 9
In 1830, the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia suggested doing a
competent investigation, and the federal government agreed, for the
first time, to assist with funding. In addition, Secretary of the
Treasury Samuel Ingham attempted to conduct an independent field
inquiry, but the effort stalled when the industry failed to cooperate. 6 '
In the interim, accidents continued to increase, moving President
Jackson in 1833 to urge Congress to enact precautionary and penal
legislation. 2 Senator Daniel Webster suggested that the Committee
on Naval Affairs study the question, 3 but Thomas Hart Benton
wanted the Judiciary Committee to conduct hearings, since regulation was suggested.64 The parties debated the propriety of federal
regulation, with some arguing that states' rights were at issue and
others arguing that freedom of business was at issue. 5 In the end, no
legislation was passed.66
The Franklin Institute presented its report to Congress in
1836,67 but Congress failed to act until after an 1837 accident which
54. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The states' attempt to use the
development of steam navigation to convey a new type of monopoly was itself a technico-legal

revolution in the Proprietary Rights area.
55. See generally Burke, BurstingBoilers and the FederalPower, 7 TECH. & CULTURE
1, 2 (1966) (analyzing the struggle of Congress and the courts to remedy steam boiler explo-

sion injuries and deaths before the establishment of federal power to regulate commercial interests to protect the public).

56. See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
57.

Burke, supra note 55, at 5.

58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 10.
60.

Id.

61.

See id. at 10-11.

62.

Id. at 12.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 14. The Franklin Institute study has been described as a "remarkable experimental technique" and a "thorough methodological approach," pinpointing the precise
problems. Id.
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claimed 140 lives and another accident in 1838 which killed 151."
Even then, the legislation finally enacted was weak, allowing for the
appointment of inspectors without qualification.6 9 Amendments to
provide for heavy penalties were also rejected, apparently on the reasoning that "enlightened
self-interest should motivate owners to pro70
vide safe operation.
The evidence, however, was to the contrary. Criminal prosecutions were rare, and resulted in light penalties,7 1 and many people
continued to die each year in explosions. 2 In 1850, 277 died; in
1851, the total was 407.73 Finally, in 1852, Congress passed a law
which essentially embodied the Franklin Institute guidelines and
conclusions of sixteen years earlier. 4 The effect of the new legislation was dramatic, and the problem was essentially solved.7 5
68. Id. at 15.
69. See Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 3, 5 Stat. 304, 304-05; Burke, supra note 55, at
16. Interestingly, the law did provide that an explosion of the boiler was prima facie evidence
of negligence on the part of the vessel, ch. 191, § 13, 5 Stat. 306, a position taken by the
Supreme Court in The Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853). The
Court concluded:
In the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company v. Derby, which was a case of
gratuitous carriage of a passenger on a railroad, this court said: "When carriers
undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public
policy and safety require that they should be held to the greatest possible care and
diligence. And whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary or
otherwise, the personal safety of passengers should not be left to the sport of chance
or the negligence of careless agents. Any negligence, in such cases, may well deserve
the epithet of gross."
We desire to be understood to reaffirm that doctrine, as resting, not only on
public policy, but on sound principles of law.
Id. at 474 (citations omitted). The Court noted that:
The thirteenth section of the act of July 7, 1838, provides: "That in all suits and
actions against proprietors of steamboats for injury arising to persons or property
from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat, or the collapse of a flue, or other
dangerous escape of steam, the fact of such bursting, collapse, or injurious escape of
steam shall be taken as full primafacie evidence sufficient to charge the defendant,
or those in his employment, with negligence, until he shall show that no negligence
has been committed by him or those in his employment."
Id. at 476 (footnotes omitted). This case is useful in responding to those who claim that negligence was always the appropriate response to the development risk of a new product.
70. Burke, supra note 55, at 16.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 18, 19.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 19; see Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61; see also Burke, supra note
55, at 20-21 (describing the provisions of the 1852 law).
75. Burke, supra note 55, at 22-23. Thirty-five percent fewer lives were lost in all accidents on steamboats in the eight years following enactment of the legislation than in the same
period prior to enactment. Id. at 22.
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The pattern of a technico-legal revolution in the Personal Injury
Risk area thus appears. In the Autonomy stage, the problem is simply denied, until the evidence becomes overwhelming. In the Conflict
stage, arguments regarding business autonomy, the frail state of the
industry, the historic lack of regulation, and the suggestion of unfair
competition are all made. Finally, it is agreed that the problem
should be studied. Normally this takes years, and there is no advance agreement to abide by the results of the study. In the Resolution stage the battle is between governmental regulation and selfregulation.
3. Risk to Other Protected Interests.- In the area of risks to
protected interests, a key technico-legal revolution is the developing
law of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. This example illustrates another aspect of technico-legal revolutions - they can be iterative, flowing over and over again over the same doctrinal ground,
propelled by changes in the technology.
The technico-legal revolution resulting from the advent of wiretapping was resolved directly by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v.
United States. 6 In the Autonomy phase, federal agents, acting in
violation of a Washington statute," connected wires to the defendant's telephone, outside his residence. 78 In the Conflict phase, the
defendant attempted to have the evidence suppressed (not for a lack
of materiality or relevance, which would put this in the evidence
area, but for a violation of the fourth amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures). 7' Chief Justice Taft, writing for
a five-to-four majority, limited the application of the amendment to
the technologies of search available at the time of its drafting and
construed the phrase "houses, persons, papers or effects" literally,
holding that wiretapping was not a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.8 0 The majority therefore found
76.
77.
78.
79.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 456-57.
See id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

80.

Id. at 465-66. In support of its holding that the wiretapping did not constitute a

search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the majority observed that:
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application for the purpose

of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far distant place. The
language of the Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The inter-

vening wires are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways
along which they are stretched.
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no constitutional violation and ruled that the wiretap evidence was
admissible.8 1
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis found the clause to contain
words of general rather than specific intent, supplying examplars of
privacy rather than a description of the specific protected area. 2
Justice Brandeis noted that technology had increased the ways in3
8
which government could obtain disclosure of private conversations.
He reasoned that the application of the Constitution must, therefore,
contemplate what the future might bring:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may
some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions. "That places the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer" was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed
"subversive of all the comforts of society." Can it be that the Constitution 8affords
no protection against such invasions of individual
4
security?
Justice Brandeis' reasoning is a bit circular. If telephone conversations are protected because people trust them to be confidential,
then the legal status derives not from the Constitution but from people's expectations of the technology. It could just as accurately be
argued that the long line of Supreme Court cases on automobile
searches, denying the right of privacy, creates a lack of expectation
of privacy in automobiles. The debate is a true technico-legal revolution because there is no common ground on which to reconcile the
two viewpoints. No amount of legal reasoning will suffice. It is a
policy judgment whether the jurist prefers wiretapping or not, relaNeither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion
of his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.

Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 466.
See id. at 471-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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tive to the benefits. The policy question is obscured by a debate over
the facts of the interception. The wiretapping technology of the time
required a physical connection. The legal theory of the time required
a trespass, which drew precise legal meaning from defined facts. If
the wires had been owned by the subscriber rather than the telephone company, Chief Justice Taft could have easily denied the legality of the wiretaps, without changing his logic. Therefore, the opponents of wiretapping argued that the defendants had "contractual
control" over the wires, while the government stressed that the wires
went outside of the "house" and were therefore unprotected.
Congress took Chief Justice Taft's invitation 5 and overruled the
decision with the Communications Act of 1934.8 The debate reopened, however, with the increased use of electronic eavesdropping
equipment such as concealed microphones, and after several decisions which relied more or less on the Olmstead physical presence
requirement,8 7 the court reversed itself in Katz v. United States8 to
declare an entirely different rule. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, concluded that the Olmstead "trespass" doctrine no longer
controlled 9 and that an electronic recording device violated the privacy of a telephone booth on which the defendant had justifiably
relied. 90 Whether the listening device physically penetrated the
booth was irrelevant, and its use constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.91
Interestingly, the Olmstead rule received a stirring defense in
Katz from Justice Black, who stated the original case perhaps a little
better than even Chief Justice Taft had. 92 Justice Black urged a
strict reading of the fourth amendment,93 protecting only "tangible
85.

Id. at 465-66. Chief Justice Taft recognized Congress' power to "protect the secrecy

of telephone messages ...

and thus depart from the common law of evidence." Id.

86. See ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605

(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
87. See, e.g., An Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (recording of defendant's

conversation on his property without his knowledge by non-trespasser held not violative of
fourth amendment); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (listening device on adja-

cent office wall held not violative of fourth amendment).
88.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

89. Id. at 353.
90. Id.
91.

Id.

92. See id. at 367-68 (Black, J., dissenting).
93.

Id. at 365 (Black, J.,dissenting). In defense of the Olmstead rule, Justice Black

called for strict constitutional construction:
While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope,
and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on
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things with size, form and weight, things capable of being searched,
seized, or both."94 He argued further that a conversation overheard
is not tangible and can be neither searched nor seized,95 and he defined wiretapping as "nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone" to which the amendment does not apply. 96
The factual analogy to eavesdropping is the core of Justice
Black's argument. However, the relationship between electronic
monitoring and human eavesdropping is a false analogy at best. People generally share an appreciation of the distinctions: the limits of
the unaided human ear, the large size and therefore easy detection
of the human presence, and the disputability of human recall. People
have long taken advantage of these realities to shield their private
acts from the listening ears of others. Electronic monitoring, on the
other hand, overcomes these natural limitations. This does not suggest that one side in this debate is correct and that the other is incorrect. Both sides, in fact, rely on false analogies.
4. Evidence.- One illustrative technico-legal revolution in the
area of Evidence is the polygraph. Polygraphs, or "lie detectors,"
grew out of the effort to bring science into criminology in the early
part of the twentieth century. For sixty years, the test enunciated in
Frye v. United States9 7 has been used in defining the admissibility of
such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the

crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution ....
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that:
The first clause protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects" . . .. The second

clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its
protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized ...."

Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
96.

Id. (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black analogized electronic monitoring to

eavesdropping:
Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing
more than eavesdropping by telephone) was . . . "an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. In those days the eavesdropper listened by

naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking
out private discourse." There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this

practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained
by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to

do so in the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967))
(citations omitted).
97. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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expert testimony concerning new sciences. 98 Even before Frye, fingerprint identification was accepted with amazing rapidity - courts
were not troubled by broad claims that no two fingerprints were
alike.99 Bullet comparisons were also quickly accepted, x0 but an
early case rejected the use of expert testimony regarding mathematical probability.' 0 ' An analysis of these technologies as technico-legal
revolutions shows a similar pattern. Initially the scientific evidence
was proffered by an expert, who supposedly had the special experience needed to guide the jury through the technological problems.
Courts soon began to separate scientific evidence into two categories:
evidence which could be supported not only by expert opinion, but
also by a plausible, reproducible test of that expertise in the courtroom, and evidence which could not. Fingerprint and ballistic identifications passed the test, but statistical and polygraph evidence did
not.
II.

BIOTECHNOLOGY AS A TECHNICO-LEGAL REVOLUTION

The foundations of modern biotechnology were laid when Watson and Crick described a structure for DNA in the early 1950's. 112
98.

In Frye, a murder conviction was upheld and the trial court's refusal to admit the

defense's offer of expert testimony of the systolic blood pressure deception test results was held
to be proper. In delineating the standard for admissibility, the Supreme Court in Frye concluded that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-

tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a

long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which

it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such

standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the

discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.
Id. at 1014.
99. See, e.g., Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 422, 198 P. 288, 290 (1921) (holding that

fingerprint impressions are admissible if introduced by qualified experts); see also Illinois v.
Jennings, 252 111.534, 546-49, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (1911) (holding photographs of finger-

prints in paint admissible with accompanying expert testimony in sustaining murder
conviction).
100. Jennings, 252 Ill. at 541, 96 N.E. at 1079.
101.

New York v. Risely, 214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 (1915) (rejecting probability evi-

dence of typewriter similarity since there was no proper foundation for probabilities).
102.

NEW

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC TECHNOLOGY: A

FRONTIER

34 (1982).
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DNA is composed of an alphabet of twenty-four amino acids.'
Each strand may be thought of as an immensely long word, composed of these twenty-four letters. In the mid-1960's, researchers began deciphering the structure of proteins, including DNA, by a
chemical analysis known as sequencing,10 4 and the sequences of
thousands of proteins were compiled into a computer data bank. 0 5
This process was converted from a science into a technology when
Cohen and Boyer described a process for inserting cut slices of protein into other proteins.10 This enabled researchers to create new
forms of life, some of which may be useful and some of which are
potentially dangerous. At the same time, researchers began assigning
specific places on the human gene to previously identified human diseases.1 07 Further, other researchers claimed that the sequences provided not only absolute identification, like a fingerprint, 08 but also
could be used to prove biological relatedness such as paternity. 0 9
Thus, the new technology spawned a first order technico-legal
revolution, by causing fundamental legal changes in all four areas of
analysis.
A.

ProprietaryRights

The Proprietary Rights issue was the first of the four to be liti0
gated. Although the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty"1
resolved the issue of the patentability of a new life form, the decision
did not involve a fundamental debate over the ownership of a new
life form, but rather a debate over statutory interpretation (how to
define the language "manufacture" and "composition of matter"
contained in the Plant Patent Act') and conflicting public policy
103.

Id. at 38.

104.

See A.

GROBSTEIN,

A

DOUBLE

IMAGE OF THE DOUBLE

HELIX

12-13 (1979)

(describing the process and importance of mapping nucleotide sequences).
105., Dr. Margaret Dayhoff, to whom this collection of Articles is dedicated, was a pioneer in the collection and publication of protein sequences. She developed both the printed
Atlas of ProteinSequences and Structure and its associated computerized database now available to researchers around the world.
106. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 104, at 13-17; see also Note, supra note 4, at 553 (discussing the Boyer-Cohen technique for splitting genetic material and the worldwide experimentation that followed).
107. See generally OFnCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsEssMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, HUMAN GENE
THERAPY: BACKGROUND PAPER 3, 63-68 (1984).
108. See Moss, DNA - The New Fingerprints,A.BAJ., May 1, 1988, at 66.
109. Id. at 70.
110. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
11I. Id. at 307; see Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (current version at 35
U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1982)).
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views (whether the patent law should be construed broadly or
narrowly 112 ).
Prior to 1930, there had been few if any attempts to patent living organisms, primarily because they were considered "products of
natureY"" That year, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act, 1 4
which permitted patent protection for some varieties of hybrid6
plants,11 5 and Congress further extended the protection in 1970.11
However, neither of these acts would permit patenting of the bacteria involved in Chakrabarty.Thus, the conflict between the two positions is clear.
The majority in Chakrabarty argued that: (1) living organisms
were excluded from the patent laws only when they are "products of
nature;" (2) the Plant Patent Act merely specifies that certain types
of plants are not "products of nature" and are therefore patentable;
(3) recombinant DNA organisms are not "products of nature" even
7
though living; and (4) therefore, DNA organisms are patentable."1
In so arguing, the majority concluded that:
Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the
Government no support. 1" 8
The dissent took the positon that: (1) there were no patents for
living organisms prior to 1930; (2) bacteria were omitted from the
1930 Act which permitted patentability; (3) bacteria are living organisms; and (4) therefore, bacteria are unpatentable." 9
112. 447 U.S. at 308-09.
113. Id. at 311.
114. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161164 (1982)).
115. See id. § 1 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1982)).
116. See Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1982)).
117. Puharich,447 U.S. at 308-18.
118. Id. at 313.
119. Id. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that:
[T]he bacteria at issue here are distinguishable from a "mineral ...created wholly
by nature" in exactly the same way as were the new varieties of plants. If a new Act
was needed to provide patent protection for the plants, it was equally necessary for
bacteria. Yet Congress provided for patents on plants but not on these bacteria. In
short, Congress decided to make only a subset of animate "human-made inventions"
patentable.
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In other words, the Chakrabarty majority focused on the process of producing the life form to determine whether it was patentable, and the dissent focused on the characteristics of the life form
itself. Either position is logical at the extreme, but when one moves
toward the center, neither position makes much sense. The majority
opinion indicates that anything produced by the "hand of man"
rather than nature is patentable. However, suppose there are two animals which are sufficiently similar genetically to interbreed, but sufficiently different physically so that such breeding is impossible.
Would artificial insemination by the "hand of man" be sufficient to
produce a patentable species? Similarly, if two animals are separated geographically, would an airplane flight to bring them together
be sufficient to constitute creation by the "hand of man"?
The dissent has a similar logical flaw. It fails to recognize just
how different recombinant DNA technology is from any other type
of cross-breeding. Recombinant DNA species with totally different
qualities can be mixed and matched, in a totally artificial environment. This is breakthrough technology, vastly different from any
prior breeding efforts.
Both sides, therefore, failed to come to grips with the nature of
the technology. Both drew immediate, shallow analogies which failed
to recognize all of the attributes of the new technology. In such an
environment, the outcome of legal decision-making tends to be
random.'
Id. at 320 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover, Justice Brennan argued
that:
[T]he 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress has included bacteria within the
focus of its legislative concern, but not within the scope of patent protection. Congress specifically excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 Act. The Court's
attempts to supply explanations for this explicit exclusion ring hollow. It is true that
there is no mention in the legislative history of the exclusion, but that does not give
us license to invent reasons. The fact is that Congress, assuming that animate objects as to which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented, excluded
bacteria from the set of patentable organisms.
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
120. Some of the same sloppy analysis is present in the computer software cases. In
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a patent could not be
issued on a program that computed an "alarm limit" to stop a process. Id. at 594-95. On the
other hand, in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Supreme Court allowed a patent
on a process for molding rubber in which the only novel component was the use of a computer
program to automatically open the mold when it was finished. The Diehr Court saw no conflict
between its opinion and the opinion in Flook. See id. at 191-92.
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B. Personal Injury Risk
A technico-legal revolution in the Personal Injury Risk area resulted from the possibility that a researcher might create a new
human pathogen with the ability to reproduce on its own.121 Compared to other high-tech hazards such a radioactive materials or
chemical poisons, the technology of production is trivial, and the
self-replicating nature of living organisms means that there can be
no concept of a "small" release of a genetically engineered pathogen.
The prospect of a technology which would allow synthesis of such a
pathogen is alarming - in this era of advanced medical care, it is
often forgotten that epidemic diseases have historically dwarfed all
man-made methods of killing people.
The free release issue was the first to spawn a conflict. Shortly
after recombinant DNA research was revealed, concerned scientists
convened a special conference to address the issue. 2 Restraint was
2 3
urged until an appropriate regulatory regime could be established.
Preliminary regulations have been set up, but these regulations utilize a very narrow criteria for action. 24 For example, "[t]he USDA's
policy . . .revolves around its belief that products developed from

recombinant DNA do not differ fundamentally from conventional
products. Many scientists disagree or question this premise, and
125
there is little actual data to back it up."
How does an agency make a no- or low-risk factual determination with regard to a new technology?' An agency's determination
of the risks related to a new technology is the precise type of "fact"
which is critical to the Determination phase. But what type of "fact"
121. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 148-51 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (reviewing the public and governmental actions taken in the face of the perceived danger of the creation of new pathogens), discussed infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
122. Jaffe, Inadequacies in the Federal Regulation of Biotecnnology, 11 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 491, 491 n.3 (1987) (discussing a 1975 conference at which guidelines for experimen-

tation were prepared).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 536-37.
125. Note, supra note 4 (discussing the need for caution in the current regulatory structure for biotechnology).
126. Some agencies have attempted to use scientists to judge the risks themselves. See
Brannigan, The First FDA Public Board of Inquiry: The Aspartame Case, in J.NYHART &
M. CARROW, supra note 14, at 181 (analyzing and critiquing the aspartame Public Board of
Inquiry). That Article was critical of the unstated value premises and professional biases of
the scientist/judges. Other commentators have adopted similar positions. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 4, at 560-63 (critiquing the process used to evaluate the risk of release experiments,
stating that such decisions "necessarily involve both factual determinations and value

judgments.").
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is it? It is a fact determined by agency policy, not by scientific expertise.127 An example of this type of "fact" is the "zero value" environmental risk for nuclear waste storage proposed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and upheld by the Supreme Court. 128 The
NRC assigned a zero value to the risk of long-term environmental
effects from the storage of nuclear waste, based on the assumption
that new technology would be developed in time to eliminate existing
long-term risks."2 9 In that case, the "fact" of the safety of nuclear
waste storage was not a scientifically provable one, but rather one
based on an agency's determination regarding the availability of future technologies.
Similarly, ascertaining the safety of recombinant DNA technology is not a matter for scientific expertise, but one for agency policy
determination, assuming an agency has been granted the right to
make such a determination.' Unfortunately, agencies often find it
convenient to disguise a policy issue as a technical issue, particularly
when evaluating poorly understood, low probability but high consequence events when accounting for such events would threaten the
agency's basic mission.
A further problem is that regulatory agencies are ordinarily created and empowered by specific statutes,'' and regardless of their
administrative procedures, normally have little control over their
own jurisdiction. In the case of genetic engineering, no agency has
clear cut authority to regulate commercial applications. 3 2 As a resuit, conflicts and gaps exist in the regulatory scheme, which is likely
to precipitate a strategic battle to determine which agency will have
regulatory jurisdiction. 3 a
In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler,34 environmen127. See Note, supra note 4, at 560-63
128.

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87

(1983) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, when it promulgated
rules declaring that the storage of nuclear waste poses no environmental risks).
129. Id. at 91-92.
130. See, e.g., id.; cf. Siegel, The Aftermath of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v.
NRDC: A Broader Notion of Judicial Deference to Agency Expertise, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L.

Riv. 331 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's standard of deference to administrative
agencies when reviewing their decisions based on technical or scientific facts).
131. See, e.g., The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342,
4365 (1982) (establishing the Council on Environmental Quality and the Science Advisory

Board, respectively),
132. See Jaffe, supra note 122, at 493-94, 531-32.

133. Id. at 531.
134.

756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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talists sought an order to enjoin the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) from approving any deliberate release experiments and to
specifically enjoin an NIH-approved experiment from being conducted at the University of California at Berkeley.135 The experiment would have involved the first deliberate release of genetically
engineered organisms into the environment. 1 36 The plaintiffs charged
that NIH had not complied with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 13 7 requirement that it prepare a detailed analysis of the
environmental impact of such proposed releases. 38 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court's
injunction against the experiment, contingent on the completion of a
more adequate environmental evaluation by NIH. 39 However, the
district court's injunction halting NIH approval of any deliberate release experiments was vacated with a warning to NIH that failure in
its attention to environmental review might endanger its future decisions on the issue. 40 The majority opinion, written by Circuit Judge
J. Skelly Wright, took particular aim at the "factual" claims made
by the University of California. 4 ' The concurrence focused both on
the need for public as opposed to expert confidence in the process,
and on the possibility that delay was a tool for those opposed to the
research. 4 2
135.

Id. at 150.

136.

Id.

137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
138. 756 F.2d at 146; see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). The circuit court "emphatically
agree[d] with the district court's conclusion that NIH ha[d] not yet displayed the rigorous
attention to environmental concerns demanded by law." 756 F.2d at 146.
139. 756 F.2d at 154-55.
140. Id. at 160.

141.

Id. In determining whether NIH had complied with NEPA, the court concluded

that:
The University's arguments defending the NIH review are completely unconvincing.
For instance, the University emphasizes that the use of chemically induced non-

frost-triggering bacteria has produced "no untoward environmental consequences."
But the Lindow-Panopoulos proposal itself stressed that the genetically engineered
bacteria would have greater "genetic stability" and "competitive fitness" than the
chemically-induced bacteria. Similarly, the University points to the presence of nonfrost-triggering bacteria in nature. At oral argument, however, the University re-

ported that these natural populations, like the chemical mutants, are probably less
stable and competitive than the genetically engineered bacteria.

Id. at 153 n.6 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 161. (MacKinnon, J., concurring) Given the novel issues presented in the
case, Judge MacKinnon addressed the need for a comprehensive analysis of all relevant environmental issues:
I can understand how the RAC scientists who are knowledgeable in this field of

genetic engineering would approve the experiment by a vote of 19-0 with no absten-
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Risk to Other Protected Interests

By forcing a direct conflict between our individual rights and
obligations and our social duties, biotechnology has opened a fundamental debate regarding the relationship of the individual to society.
This debate involves confidentiality and the use of genetic indicators
of disease. 143 Due to advances in the analysis of DNA, it is now possible to pinpoint specific individuals as carriers of genes that make
them either certain to develop particular diseases, or more likely
than other members of the population to develop those diseases."'
The conflict therefore involves whether society should allow private
parties in our society to discriminate on the basis of inherited characteristics, where that discrimination may be perfectly rational.
This revolution follows hard on the heels of the conflict in chemical and related industries over the use of results of "genetic testing"
in employment decisions.1 45 The issue is basically whether an employer can deprive an individual of a position solely because the individual is subject to a higher risk than the overall population of suffering harm from contact with certain chemicals. That debate, a
technico-legal revolution in its own right, has spawned a great deal
tions. It would seem an experiment that releases into the environment organisms
substantially the same as some already living there, and subject to the same naturally occurring controls, would present no risk. However, the general public and
those who have to pass on this action are not knowledgeable in this field and they
are easily frightened by new scientific experiments and their possible consequences.
It is such lay concerns that must here be satisfied by Environmental Assessments
and Environmental Impact Statements.
Id. at 160 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon further recognized, but nonetheless
deplored, the reality that the courts are used not only to decide issues, but to delay them while
other battles are waged:
The Foundation's conduct also has delayed this vital experiment for a very considerable period of time. The use of delaying tactics by those who fear and oppose scientific progress is nothing new. It would, however, be a national catastrophe if the
development of this promising new science of genetic engineering were crippled by
the unconscionable delays that have been brought about by litigants using the National Environmental Policy Act and other environmental legislation in other areas.
The protracted litigations involving the Alaska pipeline, nuclear power plants, and
the Clean Air Act present only a few examples.

Id.
143. For an analysis of the issues involved in genetic counseling and testing, see Wachbroit, Making the Grade: Testing for Human Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583
(1988); Note, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283 (1983) (authored by Janet Kobrin).
144. Note, supra note 143, at 1289-90.
145. See Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Workplace - A Legislative
Proposal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1985); see also Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on
Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983).
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of literature' 46 and is presently in the Determination phase.
The DNA debate has one significant attribute which was not
present in the prior debate. The argument of the chemical industry
in favor of genetic screening was that it would reduce the overall
number of injuries by avoiding exposure of more susceptible individuals.147 In the case of DNA screening, there is no such safety rationale. The purpose of screening is simply to shift away from the spe1 48
cific employer or insurer the costs of genetic diseases.
Thus, the debate in the area of Risk to Other Protected Interests is a classic technico-legal revolution. In the Autonomy phase,
employers and health insurers will simply disallow coverage for these
diseases. In the Conflict phase, insurers will describe their actions by
stating that they are "pre-existing conditions" of the type always excluded in private contracts of life or health insurance. Opponents
will argue that prohibitions on employment discrimination should
apply to health insurance, since the insurance is commonly provided
as an incidental benefit of employment.
In the Determination phase, insurers will argue that the scientific facts and precedent support their position, while opponents argue that the "political fact" of equal opportunity is more important.
Insurers will cry "socialized medicine," while workers will claim that
permitting employers the use of these heritable traits brings back an
era of inherited titles, bastardy proceedings, and other stigmas attached to people at birth.
A precise parallel to this technico-legal revolution can be found
in the debate over the use of testing for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in insurance. In a 1987 article, two insurance industry representatives set out a perfect example of the Conflict and Determination phases of a technico-legal revolution.149 The
article begins with a classic attempt to define a policy statement as a
statement of fact: Insurance is founded on the principle that policyholders with the same expected risk of loss should be treated
146.

See Peirce, supra note 145, at 772-75 (citing newspaper articles, scientific research,

and legal and ethical commentary regarding genetic susceptibility).
147.

See id. at 777.

148.

See id. at 804 (stating that the practical economics of the business world suggests

an application of genetic screening to minimize the cost of doing business by excluding those
who are "hypersusceptible"). Employer costs from genetic diseases include lost productivity,
high employee turnover, and overall insurance and liability costs. See id. at 804-05.
149. See Clifford & Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationalefor AIDS-Related
Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987).
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equally."' 50 No authority is provided for this sweeping statement, yet
it lies at the heart of the entire argument that insurers be allowed to
use AIDS test results to determine insurability. The industry is
clearly attempting to preempt the counterargument by stating the
outcome of the analysis as a fact. They then characterize those who
hold the opposite view as being somehow mislead, concluding that
"some lawmakers, understandably motivated by sympathy for persons with AIDS, are giving serious consideration to a prohibition on
any use of AIDS-related testing for insurance purposes, a ban that
would seriously distort the fair and equitable functioning of the insurance pricing system."''
The authors then engage in distinctly circular reasoning as follows: (1) existing principles of insurance, as found in current law,
mandate risk-related premiums; (2) AIDS testing is clearly risk-related; therefore, (3) legislatures which are attempting to prevent the
use of AIDS
testing are in violation of the "principles of
1 52
insurance."'
The industry advocates spend a great deal of time making the
argument of just how good a predictor the AIDS test is.15a They
then go on to make the logical argument that "adverse selection"
will cause persons who are infected with the virus to apply for insurance after they have the test.' 54 What this entire discussion ignores
is that there is no legal principle that insurance must be related to
risks - that is merely a principle of the insurance industry. 55 The
same state legislatures that set the policy of risk-oriented rates can
150. Id. at 1807.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1809. The authors cite the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a model act
drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the basis for insurance
legislation in all states, for the proposition that insurance law compels risk-related discrimination, prohibiting only unfair discrimination. Id. at 1809-10. The authors argue then that AIDS
testing to determine insurability is, therefore, not "unfair" discrimination:
To meet the fundamental fairness requirements of the UTPA and to address the
concern for unfair discrimination, insurers must continue to use objective, accurate,
and fair standards for appraising the risk of AIDS .... To ignore the risk levels
associated with infection and treat a seropositive individual on the same terms as
one not similarly infected would constitute unfair discrimination against non-infected insureds and, therefore, violate the states' Unfair Trade Practices Acts.
Id. at 1811-12 (footnotes omitted).
153. See id. at 1812-13.
154. See id. at 1817.
155. Clifford and luculano observe that principles of equity require that those with
higher health risks should be charged higher premiums. See id. at 1811 & n.29 (citing S.
HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INsURANCE 4 (10th ed. 1982)).
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clearly change that policy, as they have for race, sex, or marital status. It is a public policy judgment, part of the Resolution phase. To
avoid this result, the authors engage in a distinctly false analogy
when they dismiss state statutes which prohibit insurability decisions
based on the presence of the sickle cell trait - they argue that such
traits are harmless, so the statutes are justified. 5 6 But if the insurance industry were as rational as they portray it to be, no such statute would be needed. At least some of these statutes, however, pro-

hibit discrimination based on the reality that offspring might express
the trait. The statutes thus embody a public policy decision that we
should spread certain risks across society, rather than have them fall
on distinct individuals.
The insurance industry clearly wants to focus on the accuracy

of the test, using that to support a policy in favor of testing, rather
than to treat accuracy as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of
public policy. This is especially true because the AIDS test does not
indicate that an individual currently has the disease. 57 This omission, however, does not bother the industry, because a reasonable
statistical prediction is sufficient for their purposes.' 58
For the purpose of comparison, another critical step in the Determination phase occurs when the industry equates a positive AIDS
test result to a "symptom" of a disease.' 59 It is highly questionable
156.

Id. at 1811 n.32 (quoting

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

SCIENCES, THE S-HEMOGLOBINOPATHIES:

FORCES

AN EVALUATION OF THEIR STATUS IN THE ARMED

1-2 (1973)).

157. See id. at 1814. The authors themselves note, "Despite the wealth of medical data
that lends support to AIDS-related testing for insurance purposes, utilization of such tests is
sometimes questioned because there are a significant number of individuals who have tested
positive but have not yet developed AIDS." Id.
158. See id. The positive tests in individuals who have not contracted the disease is seen
by the authors as irrelevant to insurance:
Underwriting is, by its very nature, concerned with probabilities, not certainties; no
one knows how many infected people will eventually develop AIDS. Even assuming
that "only" twenty percent will contract AIDS during the first five years, there is a
demonstrable risk that a large percentage of infected individuals will develop AIDS
in year six and beyond.
Id.
159. See id. at 1820-21. The presence of the AIDS antibody in an individual's blood is
compared to the presence of a "pre-existing condition," normally a condition that is symptomatic of a particular disease. In order to discourage adverse selection by insureds, policies
routinely contain pre-existing condition clauses, which limit or exclude coverage for illnesses
when their symptoms were apparent within a specified period before the policy was taken out.
The authors reason that a positive AIDS test could trigger such a clause, but also note that
lengthy AIDS latency periods would undermine its utility. Using New York state as an example, the authors conclude that limiting coverage in this way would be logical:
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whether an indication that an individual is more likely to develop a
disease in the future is tantamount to a symptom of the disease. The
authors simply gloss over this point, yet extended further, risk-oriented rates might justify future genetic testing of infants and their
assignment to health and life insurance categories based on their genetic heritage. While this is undoubtedly possible, a state might decide as a matter of policy that it would not permit such an action.
This is not to suggest that legislatures would be compelled to
take such a policy action, only that they would not be foreclosed. A
legislature might easily distinguish between genetic conditions and
acquired diseases. However, whichever principle is established for
AIDS in this area will almost certainly affect the legal status of individuals with genetic predispositions to disease.
D. Evidence
The evidentiary uses of biotechnology are only beginning to be
exploited. Most of the issues to date have involved a more primitive
technology than recombinant DNA, and most of the cases have relied on a more simplistic understanding of the nature of inherited
characteristics. The cases thus share many of the characteristics of
earlier cases involving evidentiary use of statistics.
A 1988 Maryland case, Kammer v. Young, 6 0 illustrates the nature of the evidentiary revolution with regard to genetic testing. Maryland has a statute mandating the admissibility of certain genetic
tests if they provide at least a 97.3 % probability of proving paternity. 161 The problem with the application of this standard was not
only that the method of calculation varied between the statistical
and paternity testing communities, but also that the method used by
For instance, New York interprets such a condition to be the "existence of symptoms which would ordinarily cause a prudent person to seek diagnosis, care or treatment within a two-year period preceding the effective date of the coverage of the
insured person." Positive antibody tests would, in all likelihood, motivate a reasonable individual to obtain further medical attention. Thus, if such a condition were
present and were to come within the time limits set for a pre-existing condition, an
insurer arguably would be justified in denying coverage for AIDS. For any disease
other than AIDS, the identical situation would invariably lead to a denial of
coverage.
Id. (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. I, § 52.2(u) (1982)) (footnotes omitted).
160, 73 Md. App. 565, 535 A.2d 936, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
161. MD.FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1029 (1984) (permitting blood test results to be
received in evidence if "(i) definite exclusion is established; or (ii) the testing is sufficiently
extensive to exclude 97.3 % of alleged fathers who are not biological fathers, and the statistical
probability of the alleged father's paternity is at least 97.3%").
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the paternity testing community required a base assumption of a
fifty percent probability based solely on the defendant's status as the
putative father. The mathematical basis for the fifty percent assumption was explained by expert testimony in the following manner:
If you know nothing about a set of possibilities then the principle of
insufficient reason says you are entitled to assign equal prior
probability to those alternatives. [T]hat's what's used to get this .5.
This .5 comes from a principle that says we don't know whether he
was the father or somebody else was the father. So we are going to
split the probability fifty-fifty between the two possibilities. We are
going to load him with 50 percent of it and give the other percent
62
to all the other men.
The court explicitly upheld this determination under the Frye
rule.' 63 The court acknowledged that the use of this assumption in
the paternity community did not result in a true statistical
probability,6 4 but claimed that the legislature had made the policy
choice. 6 5
162. Kammer, 73 Md. App. at 576, 535 A.2d at 941.
163. Id. at 576 n.14, 535 A.2d at 941 n.14. Relying on the test enunciated in Frye for
admission of scientific evidence, discussed supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text, the court
accepted the prior probability formula because the use of .5 as a basis was accepted "in the
relevant community." 73 Md. App. at 576 n.14, 535 A.2d at 941 n.14.
164. Id. at 573-74, 535 A.2d at 940. Nevertheless, the court reasoned:
The fact that the application of Bayes' Theorem, with a prior probability of .5, to
the paternity index does not yield a "true" statistical probability of paternity does
not invalidate the procedure or the result. The procedure used in this case is universally accepted by the relevant community of paternity blood testers and is the same
procedure that was being used in 1984 when the Legislature amended the blood
testing statute to require the introduction of blood test evidence.
Id. The court concluded that other factors, although relevant, were not necessary to a valid
test:
In this formula, P(F) represents the prior probability and it is factored into the
equation in order to account for the non-genetic evidence of the accused man's
paternity.
Ideally, the prior probability should reflect an assessment of all the relevant
non-genetic evidence in each individual case and should take into consideration such
factors as the accused man's opportunity for access to the child's mother during the
period of conception, the evidence linking the child's mother to other men during
that time period and the credibility of the witnesses. In the case sub judice, however, an assumed prior probability of fifty percent (.5) was used in converting appellant's paternity index to a statistical probability.
Id. at 575, 535 A.2d at 941 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 572-73, 535 A.2d at 939-40. The court supported its holding with the following interpretation of legislative intent:
We hold that the legislature used the term "statistical probability" within the context and according to the meaning contained in the testimony of the experts from
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The Kammer case exposes two issues arising from the technicolegal revolution regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence.
First, who are the relevant experts under the Frye test? Second,

what is the underlying nature of the testimony? As the case illustrates, even a sophisticated analysis, taken to eight decimal places,
ultimately relies on a preliminary guess as to the likelihood of
paternity.
The same issues arose in People v. Collins, 6' in which the California Supreme Court held that any underlying assumptions used to
support a probability must themselves be supported. 67 The only justification for adoption of the contrary rule in Kammer is the fact
that the "paternity community" uses the .5 assumption. This is certainly irrelevant. Paternity determination is a quasi-judicial decision,
regardless of where it is made.
Reliance on the expertise of a given technological field requires
consideration of why the particular technology operates the way it
does. For example, Loevinger endorses the introduction of computerized records under the business records exception, but suggests that
the Frye test for admission of scientific evidence is "not nearly so
clear or logical as it sounds."""8 However, both tests spring from the
whom it heard ....
....To the blood testing community, the terms plausibility and probability carry
with them a distinction without a difference. To express the paternity index ratio,
which in this case is 460 to 1, as percentage requires the use of a statistical formula.
The legislature called the resulting percentage a "statistical probability". Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that appellee's expert witnesses are qualified, within the
relevant community, to conduct the calculations necessary to express the 460 to I
paternity index as a percentage as is required by the statute. We note that appellant's witness, Dr. Chase, acknowledged at trial that the methods and terms used by
the blood testing laboratory are universal in the field of paternity testing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
166. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The California Supreme
Court in Collins rejected the prosecution's attempt to call a mathematics instructor to testify
as to the mathematical probability of the defendant's guilt based on statistical probabilities
assumed by the prosecutor:
[T]he prosecutor not only made his own assertions of these factors in the hope that
they were "conservative" but also in later argument to the jury invited the jurors to
substitute their "estimates" should they wish to do so. We can hardly conceive of a
more fatal gap in the prosecution's scheme of proof.
Id. at 328, 438 P.2d at 38-39, 66 Cal Rptr. at 503.
167. Id. The court relied on State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966), which
reversed a conviction obtained with probabilistic evidence. The Sneed court held that "mathematical odds are not admissible as evidence to identify a defendant in a criminal proceeding so
long as the odds are based on estimates, the validity of which have not been demonstrated."
Sneed, 76 N.M. at 354, 414 P.2d at 862 (emphasis added).
168. Loevinger, supra note 11, at 7.
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same underlying rationale - if trained experienced people in the
outside world properly rely on the evidence, then so should a court.
Expertise which is created and used solely within the judicial
environment is properly examined at a higher level of scrutiny. The
issue is particularly important when dealing with the "forensic sciences," that is, those sciences which have very limited use outside of
the courtroom, or with polygraphs, which are freely used because the
penalty for a "false positive" is minimal.
One Illinois court commented extensively on the use of genetic
markers on semen samples and analysis of hair samples as evidence
in a criminal case.:"" The evidence, properly analyzed, could do no
more than indicate that it was not impossible that the defendant was
the source of the samples. 70 Obviously, the utility of such evidence
depends upon the size of the group that the scientific evidence places
71
the plaintiff within.
The problem occurs when the technique used in these cases is

reversed. Assume a specific piece of evidentiary information and access to a data base which contains the same information for the pop169. See People v. Linscott, 159 I11.App. 3d 71, 511 N.E.2d 1303 (1987).
170. Id. at 77, 511 N.E.2d at 1307. Upon an examination of the testimony of the prosecution's expert witness, the court concluded that:
The strongest hair testimony prosecution's expert gave to support the State's case
against defendant is that defendant's hair samples were "consistent" with the hairs
to which he had compared them, and that therefore he could not exclude the possibility that the hairs that were found were from the defendant. However, [the expert] also testified that if hairs from other persons had been submitted to him for
comparison, they could also have been "consistent" with the hairs that were found.
[The prosecution's expert] did not testify that the hairs matched or that they
were identical. Moreover, any reasonable reading of [the expert's] testimony establishes that [he] did not intend his testimony to mean that the hairs were consistent
in the sense that they matched or were identical. Specifically, when the prosecutor
attempted to get [the expert] to state that the hairs that were found and defendant's
hairs matched, [he] very carefully avoided testifying that they matched ....
Id.
171. The court's reasoning relied, in part, upon various studies conducted by Barry Gaudette, a forensic scientist. The court, however, observed that the conclusions from Gaudette's
studies are not applicable to all hair comparisons. Id. at 79, 511 N.E.2d at 1308-09. "Gaudette
admonishes that the odds to which he makes reference 'should not be applied blindly to all
cases.' This admonishment is critical here because there is no evidence that [prosecution's
expert] made the same number of hair comparisons that were made in Gaudette's study." Id.
(quoting Gaudette, Some Further Thoughts on Probabilitiesand Human Hair Comparisons,
23 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 758, 760 (1978)) (citations omitted). In a study comparing human pubic
hairs, Gaudette utilized 26 characteristics for comparison and a total of "'101,368 comparisons were made between 454 hairs from 60 different individuals.'" Id. at 80, 511 N.E.2d at
1309 (quoting Gaudette, Probabilitiesand Human Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 514, 517 (1976)).
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ulation-at-large. What level of certainty should be required to admit
the evidence? Using the Kammer sample, assume that 1/460 males
could be the father, and a check of the data base produces ten "suspects." Would such data be admissible? The court speculated on related issues in Collins.1 72 In the past, attempts to establish national
data bases have been resisted, generally on privacy grounds. In the
case of biotechnology, such a movement from one area (Evidence) to
another (Risk to Other Protected Interests) is indicative of a first
order technico-legal revolution.
III.

FIRST ORDER TECHNICO-LEGAL REVOLUTIONS AND
STRATEGIC PLANNING

As previously noted, in a "first order" technico-legal revolution
it is possible to use arguments in one field of a revolutionary technology

to

influence

another.

For

example,

in

Diamond v.

1 3

Chakrabarty, 7 the parties opposing the grant of a patent attempted
to use safety issues to influence the court on the patent issue. The
17 4
court resisted the attempt.
The connection of the privacy issues with the question of evi-

172. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1986). The court stated that:
The prosecution's approach, however, could furnish the jury with absolutely no
guidance on the crucial issue: Of the admittedly few such couples, which one, if
any, was guilty of committing this robbery? Probability theory necessarily remains
silent on that question, since no mathematical equation can prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the guilty couple infact possessed the characteristics described by
the People's witnesses, or even (2) that only one couple possessing those distinctive
characteristics could be found in the entire Los Angeles area.
... On the contrary, as we explain in the Appendix, the prosecution's figures
actually imply a likelihood of over 40 percent that the Collinses could be "duplicated" by at least one other couple who might equally have committed the San
Pedro robbery. Urging that the Collinses be convicted on the basis of evidence
which logically establishes no more than this seems as indefensible as arguing for
the conviction of X on the ground that a witness saw either X or X's twin commit
the crime.
Id. at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05 (emphasis in original).
173. 447 U.S. 303 (1980), discussed supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
174. 447 U.S. at 316-17. In response to a claim by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks that the Court should consider the potential dangers in determining whether the
defendant's invention was patentable, the Court concluded that:
[W]e are without competence to entertain these arguments - either to brush them
aside as fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them. The choice
we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative
process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies
can provide and courts cannot.
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dence is an obvious concern. For example, will each husband in a
divorce proceeding demand genetic testing of the children before
paying child support?
In Knill v. Knill,175 the Maryland Court of Appeals allowed a
huisband to deny support to a child of his marriage who could be
proved to be the child of another man by genetic testing. 1 6 Since the
defense was acceptable, it would seem logical that a child could be
compelled to undergo testing to produce the needed information, as
fathers are often compelled by statute to submit to genetic testing.
Any privacy barrier to such testing would collapse in the face of any
similar interest. Insurance companies attempting to enforce "pre-existing condition" laws could be expected to demand that policy holders submit to tests, and law enforcement agencies could build routine
fingerprint-style genetic data banks. Some would argue that computer privacy was lost in this precise step-by-step process.
CONCLUSION

The development of biotechnology gives rise to a first order
technico-legal revolution. We are in the initial stage of a process that
will involve legal judgments, political choices, and factual determinations. This process can be distorted if the legal system unknowingly
accepts policy judgments as facts, or fails to predict how resolutions
in one area will affect other areas. The concept of a technico-legal
revolution can be used to put all the facts and claims into proper
perspective and provide proper past analogies to current technological developments.

175.
176.
177.

306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986).
Id.
See, e.g., Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 5, at 48-53.
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